Some further thoughts on Sidgwick's epistemology

Utilitas 22 (1):78-89 (2010)
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Abstract

This article is a reply to Anthony Skelton's . Professor Skelton, in his article, makes several objections to the account of Sidgwick's epistemology I presented in my earlier article . I answer these objections by further explaining my account

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John Deigh
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Henry Sidgwick.Bartonn D. Schultz - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - International Journal of Ethics 41 (3):343-351.

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