Abstract

The central aim of this essay is to elucidate a model of moral motivation that is consistent with a contemporary theory of psychological motivation. Three recent developments are incorporated into the model of psychological motivation presented. First, is the adoption of an evolutionary perspective focusing on the development psychological mechanisms to solve the problems faced by evolving humans. Second, is the use of an information-processing conception of cognitive processes in understanding human motivation. Third, is the conception of psychological motivation as a process which is a synergistic blend of cognition and affect. ;Moral theories are meant to prescribe action. Although a moral theory might not be expected to specifically account for how the behavior it prescribes is motivated, it is important that the model of moral motivation relied upon be consistent with a psychological explanation of human behavior. Motivation is defined here as that force producing or explaining behavior. This definition of motivation must be kept distinct from that of motivation as the justification a person provides for an action performed. Psychological theory provides good reasons to believe that although most persons can present a motive to justify behavior performed, they often lack cognitive access to the factors that actually explain the production of their behavior. ;The model of psychological motivation suggested by a thorough exploration of a variety of scholarly and scientific studies is quite complex. The interaction of inherited personality traits and environmental experiences results in adopting a particular perspective on an individual's relationship to the world and others in it. Cognition and emotion operate within the perspective taken in imagining a schema involving the self and all other persons, objects, and events relevant to a situation. The imagined schema calls forth the emotions appropriate to it, and these serve as proximate motivators of behavior. ;The implication of the model presented is that those moral theories which rely on either reason or emotion alone to motivate moral behavior are lacking in motivational force. Whereas they may be an adequate account of the justification of moral action, they prove inadequate for an explanation of such behavior