Abstract

In this essay I attempt to shed some light on the moral status of animals and provide a framework for further illumination. I attempt in chapter one to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for having moral status, which I tie to having interests. My conclusion is that the key characteristic is conation. ;In chapter two I distinguish the concepts of equal moral status and equal consideration of identical interests--which have not been clearly distinguished, leading to confusion. Moral status is the degree of moral resistance to having one's interests thwarted. Crucially, the principle of equal consideration --which I defend--is consistent with the thesis that differences in moral status exist. ;In chapter three I defend a moral methodology that employs both an intuitive method and a principle of maximizing interests. In doing so I attempt to refute various misconceptions regarding intuition. I then examine categories of judgments I call 'fixed intuitions' and 'strong intuitions' and assess their epistemological strength. ;In chapter four I endeavor to identify the most important interests--experiential welfare, freedom, autonomy, and life--and the characteristics that underlie them. Then I make suggestions regarding which animals possess these interests . I also discuss various interests typically had by humans that substantially add to the value of their lives. I reach various normative conclusions by interest-maximization. While some are general in character, concerning, for example, the comparative values of different kinds of lives, others are more specific and concern the harmful use of animals in research. For example, I contend that research animals are usually provided inadequate living space. ;Finally, I test these conclusions in chapter five with the intuitive method, using fixed and strong intuitions, before concluding. I contend that differences in moral status show up mainly with respect to life-interests and freedom-interests, but that the principle of equal consideration evens out moral status to a greater degree than is generally acknowledged