Abstract

This dissertation seeks to understand how Baruch Spinoza's social and political philosophy follows from his ethics of psychotherapy. Specifically, I examine whether Spinoza attributes any role to society and politics in the attainment of happiness, what that role may be, and how, concretely, it calls on the virtuous person, i.e. the philosopher, to behave. Since Spinoza's ethics consists in psychotherapy, of which the Stoics are the most famous ancestor, I have undertaken this study in the form of a critical dialogue between Spinoza and the Stoics concerning the question of society and virtue. The Stoic influence is prominent in Spinoza's critique of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and attempt to provide an alternative metaphysics and ethics---so much so that some scholars have identified Stoicism as Spinoza's greatest influence. Nevertheless, Spinoza ultimately diverges from the Stoics concerning such issues as the principle of psychotherapy, the nature of virtue, and the possibility of moral perfection and unassailable happiness. As a result of these differences, Spinoza renders society integral to the attainment of virtue, a point on which, I argue, he would find the Stoics to be deficient. The Stoic wise man is largely a social anomaly, and thanks to quasi-Stoic expressions, Spinoza suggests lingering Stoic misgivings regarding the public place of the philosopher. However, it follows from Spinoza's Ethics that the philosopher is a firmly social and political being: his political concern does not extend merely so far as securing a private place for philosophy, but rather, he is deeply invested in the welfare of the state insofar as it nourishes and sustains him and his particular discipline. He genuinely desires his neighbors welfare, to which he contributes by exercising caution regarding his area of expertise; his caution is precisely his manner of observing the nature of political power, and in turn, his personal interest. Thus, I conclude that the philosopher's caution is a direct expression of political concern and interest