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In Samuel D. Guttenplan, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 109–131 (1994)
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Abstract

In contrast to what merely happens to us, or to parts of us, actions are what we do. My moving my finger is an action, to be distinguished from the mere motion of that finger. My snoring likewise is not something I ‘do’ in the intended sense, though in another, broader sense, it is something I often ‘do’ while asleep.

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9781405164597   9780631199960

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10.1002/9781405164597.ch1

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