The life cycle of scientific principles—a template for characterizing physical principles

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Abstract

Scientific principles can undergo various developments. While philosophers of science have acknowledged that such changes occur, there is no systematic account of the development of scientific principles. Here we propose a template for analyzing the development of scientific principles called the ‘life cycle’ of principles. It includes a series of processes that principles can go through: prehistory, elevation, formalization, generalization, and challenge. The life cycle, we argue, is a useful heuristic for the analysis of the development of scientific principles. We illustrate this by discussing examples from foundational physics including Lorentz invariance, Mach’s principle, the naturalness principle, and the perfect cosmological principle. We also explore two applications of the template. First, we propose that the template can be employed to diagnose the quality of scientific principles. Second, we discuss the ramifications of the life cycle’s processes for the empirical testability of principles.

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2025-03-12

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Radin Dardashti
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Enno Fischer
Technische Universität Dresden

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References found in this work

String Theory and the Scientific Method.Richard Dawid - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
Dynamics of Reason.Michael Friedman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702-712.
Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth.L. Laudan - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (1):57-71.

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