Sentience and the Primordial ‘We’: Contributions to Animal Ethics from Phenomenology and Buddhist Philosophy

Environmental Values 32 (2):215-236 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper explores the ontological bases for ethical behaviour between human animals and non-human animals drawing on phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy. Alongside Singer and utilitarianism, I argue that ethical behaviour regarding animals is most effectively justified and motivated by considerations of sentience. Nonetheless, utilitarianism misses crucial aspects of sentience. Buddhist ethics is from the beginning focused on all sentient beings, not solely humans. This inclusivity, and refined interrogations of suffering, means it can furnish more nuanced understandings of sentience. For phenomenology, sentience includes the capacities for self-awareness and, I will argue, a plural self-awareness; the ‘I’ belongs to a ‘we’, and the ‘we’ is constitutive of the ‘I’. This ‘primordial we’ provides the basis for rethinking the moral relations between human animals and non-human animals. I contend finally we thus have an ontological basis in ‘interanimality’ to explain why we most often do and should care about all sentient beings.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-08

Downloads
38 (#632,754)

6 months
10 (#312,841)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anya Daly
University of Tasmania

Citations of this work

Nature Breaks through Our Worldviews.Tom Greaves - 2023 - Environmental Values 32 (2):119-125.
Coemergent eco-consciousness and self-consciousness.Kalpita Bhar Paul - 2024 - Environmental Values 33 (3):253-256.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Phenomenology of Perception.Aron Gurwitsch, M. Merleau-Ponty & Colin Smith - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (3):417.
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan & Mary Midgley - 1986 - The Personalist Forum 2 (1):67-71.

View all 30 references / Add more references