Coming Together

In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 500–518 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The notion of “phenomenal field” often occurs when philosophers attempt to characterize the unity of consciousness. The phenomenal unity relationship is distinct from the coinstantiation relation. There are grounds for supposing that experiences can be phenomenally unified in the absence of any higher‐order conscious state, and in the absence of any spatial relations of a phenomenal kind. There is a way in which phenomenal unity can be construed as a primitive feature of experience. Rather than starting off from the perspective of particular experiences and looking for what binds them into more complex states, we can start with the more complex states, and regard simpler token experiences as unified by virtue of being parts of such states. The phenomenal unity relationship can as easily be viewed as a relationship between experiential parts, as it can experiential wholes.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,248

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-22

Downloads
86 (#247,717)

6 months
2 (#1,661,894)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Barry Francis Dainton
University of Liverpool

Citations of this work

Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):556-572.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references