The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility

Ideas Y Valores 68 (171):231-249 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper returns to the very concept of moral responsibility. Its focus is not on the conditions but on the nature of moral responsibility. First, it introduces the Strawsonian and ledger conceptions of moral responsibility. Next, it contrasts and compares these conceptions. Finally, it evaluates both conceptions and asks which is the right one. Though this article works toward further clarifying the concept of moral responsibility, its conclusion is open-ended.

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2019-09-18

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Two faces of responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227–48.
Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties.Peter Frederick Strawson - 1985 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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