Abstract

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;In 'Justice as Fitness' I have argued that a unifying and coherent account of the concept of justice can be given. Injustice, I have suggested, is to be understood in terms of the notion of treating someone unfittingly, that is, by treating them as if they were less, or lower, than they are. This account of justice suggests that desert is central to justice; to treat someone as less than they are is to treat them in a manner in which they deserve not to be treated. It is intended that this account of the concept of justice be consistent with the various conceptions of justice, that is, with the various conceptions of what is and is not just, and that these various conceptions be illuminated by being viewed as interpretations of the 'justice as fitness' concept of justice. ;In the course of defending this view, rule-relative and nonrule-relative justice are compared and contrasted, an attempt is made to place the concept of justice in relation to such concepts as authority, merit and worthiness, degradation and value, and the view that justice is always a matter of desert is defended against the charge that considerations, irreducible to desert without conceptual impropriety, are relevant. The problematic character of people being said to deserve compensation and treatment in accordance with their contribution are explored. Accounts of the obligation to keep a promise, and the political obligation, are offered. It is argued that there is reason to believe that reasons for action are incommensurable