Abstract

It is contended that Jurgen Habermas's (1972, 1984) attempts to overcome the problems that positivist thought has caused for theorizing rationality has actually exacerbated positivism's negative effects on conceptualizing rational thought. An overview of Hilary Putnam's (1981) examination of logical positivism's understanding of rationality is presented, emphasizing that positivist approaches toward theorizing rationality are essentially self-refuting in nature since they utilize a metaphysical perspective. Potential objections to the delineation of logical positivism's account of rationality as self-refuting are addressed. Habermas' analysis of positivism's influence on rationality & his concept of communicative competence are then reviewed. Examination of Habermas' attempt to establish a "universal pragmatics" & his contention that validity claims are rationalized through argumentative discourse is performed, leading to the conclusion that such theorizing of rationality is ultimately metaphysical in nature. Treatments of rationality that attempt to impart a comprehensive account of rationality are deemed unintelligible; consequently, it is maintained that all-encompassing delineations of rationality should be avoided in order to produce viable theories of rational thought.