Why Subjectivity Reveals Man as Person

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):227-244 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper I ask what subjectivity is and why it reveals man as person, as Karol Wojtyla and others claim. First, I explain subjectivity, which I also call interiority, in terms of self-presence, which is a mode of relating to myself from within myself. I am present to myself as subject, not only as object. Only I can encounter myself in the intimacy of my self-presence; no other person can be present to me as I am to myself. Next, I further explore self-presence as weak or strong, calling strong self-presence recollected self-presence. Finally, I conclude by explaining how it is that recollected self-presence reveals man as person. Against the suspicion that this “turn to the subject” opens the door to a bad subjectivism, I argue that it entirely coheres with the realism of Christian philosophy.

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John F. Crosby
Franciscan University of Steubenville

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