Abstract

I explore an application of Wittgenstein's later writings to questions of the justification and explanation of moral perception which rejects the possibility of a radical rift between facts and values. Both the motivational and the justificatory force of traditional ethical theories depend upon our ability to see the relevant similarities between cases. If reason giving must begin from where we are already situated, then there are no independent grounds from which ethical theory or epistemology can arise. And if ethical theory always presupposes particular ways of seeing, then Wittgenstein's injunctions to look and see for ourselves have important ethical implications. A reading of Mark Twain's Adventures of Huckleberry Finn exemplifies the way in which the ethical point of view arises from within everyday situations and conversions in points of view proceed by way of conversions not necessarily dependent for motivation or justification upon arguments. The discussion of the duck/rabbit puzzle case shows the inadequacy of arguments which seek to justify inferentially how we see and respond to persons. Connections to a shared world with other human beings do not need to be inferentially justified because of our situated commitments within ways of seeing. The ideal of transcending these relations leads to the kinds of philosophical confusion exemplified by the Tractatus. I argue that avoiding these problems allows us to overcome a kind of moral and political separation from other persons, focusing attention on the importance of how we see each other, both the differences and the similarities of our human aspect.