On Kaplan on Carnap on significance

Philosophical Studies 30 (6):393 - 400 (1976)
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Abstract

In 'the methodological character of theoretical concepts' carnap offered a sophisticated criterion of empirical significance. Unfortunately, Shortly thereafter david kaplan devised a pair of devastating counter-Examples which appeared to show that carnap's criterion was simultaneously too wide and too narrow. In this note I show that kaplan's first counter-Example misses its mark and that his second counter-Example can be avoided by a natural generalization of carnap's method

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Citations of this work

Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 193.
Vindicating the verifiability criterion.Hannes Leitgeb - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):223-245.
Vienna circle.Thomas Uebel - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Carnap on Empirical Significance.Sebastian Lutz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):217-252.

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