Rationality, diagnosis and patient autonomy

Oxford Handbook Psychiatric Ethics (2014)
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Abstract

In this chapter, our focus is the role played by notions of rationality in the diagnosis of mental disorders, and in the practice of overriding patient autonomy in psychiatry. We describe and evaluate different hypotheses concerning the relationship between rationality and diagnosis, raising questions about what features underpin psychiatric categories. These questions reinforce widely held concerns about the use of diagnosis as a justification for overriding autonomy, which have motivated a shift to mental incapacity as an alternative justification. However, this approach too has recently been criticized from a mental disability rights perspective. Our analysis of the relationship between mental capacity and rationality is used to illuminate these concerns, and to investigate further the relationship between rationality and psychiatric diagnosis.

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Author Profiles

Jillian Craigie
King's College London
Lisa Bortolotti
University of Birmingham

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References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison, Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Oxford University Press. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, John Sadler, Stanghellini Z., Morris Giovanni, Bortolotti Katherine, Broome Lisa & Matthew.
Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.

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