How Expertise is Enabled: Why Epistemic Cycles Matter to us All

Social Epistemology 38 (1):83-97 (2024)
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Abstract

Rather than ask if expertise is under threat, this paper uses case studies to show how expertise is enabled. Its appearance can be traced to how the already known evokes sensibility, judging, thinking and languaging. As defined below, it draws on epistemic cycles. Using Secchi and Cowley’s (2021) 3M model, this posits a second cut between the micro and the macro. In the mesosphere, people create temporary domains or what William James (1991) calls ‘little worlds’. Within these corpora popularia, the new is made possible – expertise sets off unimagined outcomes. Thus, many concerns cannot be solved by scientific correlates of a natural ontological attitude: indeed, the truism clarifies many social challenges. We lack social institutions that dedicate expertise to goals like ecosocial justice and life-sustaining relations. Once the necessary expertise is traced to epistemic cycles, we can demand of institutions that they create bodies that seek to bring a rich future to evolution.

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References found in this work

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Cognition in the Wild.Edwin Hutchins - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):486-492.
The cultural ecosystem of human cognition.Edwin Hutchins - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-16.
Pragmatism.William James - 1943 - Philosophical Review 52:623.

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