Some concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s view

Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):419-430 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper provides some responses to Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book (2016). I first provide a description of the authors’ framework for thinking about multiple realization and the conditions they claim this involves. I explain what I think they get right and what they get wrong with this framework. After this, I then consider a few examples of multiple realization they discuss and the interpretations they offer. While I am sympathetic to several things they say about multiple realization, I also think there are some questions that have yet to be answered.

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Mark Couch
Seton Hall University

Citations of this work

Multiple realizability.John Bickle - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Responses to critics.Thomas Polger & Lawrence Shapiro - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):446-457.
Multiple Realization in Systems Biology.Wei Fang - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):663-684.

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References found in this work

What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
Natural Laws in Scientific Practice.John W. Carroll - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):240-245.
Multiple realization in comparative perspective.Mark B. Couch - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):505-519.
Functional explanation in context.Mark Couch - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (2):253-269.

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