Abstract

Two factors shape modern politics: moral individualism and fundamental rights on one hand, social exigency in terms of solidarity and protecting particular cultures on the other. Furthermore, what binds citizens within a political community is established with respect to one's patriotic identification---which is often rooted in complex dynamics---and with respect to critical appropriation. The question raised here is the political problem of unity and plurality, and more fundamentally the problem of human sociality, of connecting and disconnecting, of attraction and repulsion, of love and hate. The tension between these extremes structures contradictory representations of political reality, namely liberal and communitarian representations. Can individualistic and communitarian aspirations be rendered compatible while ensuring the moral integrity of individual judgment, which of course is critical in the development publicly spirited or civically inclined individuals? ;Our research examines the philosophical conditions of political sociality which satisfy the principle of moral individualism and the social exigency of solidarity, both being characteristic of modern democracies. The perspective of moral individualism and the perspective of social exigency of solidarity are considered with respect to the concept of civic friendship. This political category, which tends to be forgotten, is reintroduced here insofar as it is linked to both the principle of justice, which is central to liberal philosophy, and to the principle of political solidarity, central in communitarian thought. We argue that civic friendship establishes an equilibrium of sorts between moral individualism and political and social solidarity. ;Insofar as elaborating common principles are concerned, we have found in Rawls' theory of justice the critical thinking and the minimalist normative framework best-suited to this task. This theory surprisingly establishes the link we were seeking between the liberal principle of justice and the principle of civic friendship---a certain way of being together politically---with each reinforcing the other. ;Thusly, we claim that modern personality requires a sphere of freedom as well as a common world. Even though a common world extends in its own way history and tradition, it is nevertheless neither closed nor given. It needs to be constantly rebuilt, and as with freedom, it rests upon the human condition of plurality and dialogue. Such a world is made of events, narratives and roots itself political participation of citizens. In a word, such a world turns each citizen into a maker or creator of relations, an obligated of the world