Blame-Free Desert

Res Philosophica 101 (4):835-841 (2024)
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Abstract

Despite their differences, responsibility theories of all types (skeptics, forward-looking, backward-looking) concur on the following conditional: If someone deserved to suffer for an act, then they would be blameworthy for that act. Here I sketch a way of rejecting that conditional. In particular, using some of Śāntideva’s distinctions, I offer a new way of thinking about desert: Wrongdoers deserve to, and do, suffer for their wrongdoings, but they do not deserve our blame. It may be that vice is (part of) its own deserved punishment, whether or not anyone can have the free will required for blameworthiness. More generally, wrongdoers may not deserve negative responses of any kind from anyone else, yet they may still deservedly suffer in proportion to their wrongdoings.

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Daniel Coren
Seattle University

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