Outline of an Intensional Theory of Truth

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 63 (1):81-108 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We expand on the fixed point semantic approach of Kripke via the addition of two unary intensional operators: a paradoxicality operator Π where Π(Φ) is true at a fixed point if and only if Φ is paradoxical (i.e., if and only if Φ receives the third, non-classical value on all fixed points that extend the current fixed point), and an unbounded truth operator Υ⊤ where Υ⊤(Φ) is true at a fixed point if and only if any fixed point extending the current fixed point can be extended to one on which Φ receives the value true. We prove a generalized version of Kripke’s fixed point theorem guaranteeing the existence of models of this new language, as well as an expressive completeness result. We conclude with an exploration of the significant improvements in expressive power that result from the addition of these new operators, and we precisely identify what still cannot be said on this intensional extension of the Kripkean framework.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,607

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates.Luca Castaldo - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Logic 18 (7):688-723.
The fixed points of belief and knowledge.Daniela Schuster - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
Fixed-points of Set-continuous Operators.O. Esser, R. Hinnion & D. Dzierzgowski - 2000 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (2):183-194.
Supervaluation fixed-point logics of truth.Philip Kremer & Alasdair Urquhart - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):407-440.
Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth.Philip Kremer - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363-403.
A fixed point theorem for the weak Kleene valuation scheme.Anil Gupta & Robert L. Martin - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):131 - 135.
Fixed point logics.Anuj Dawar & Yuri Gurevich - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):65-88.
The expressive power of fixed-point logic with counting.Martin Otto - 1996 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (1):147-176.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-11-20

Downloads
30 (#740,797)

6 months
11 (#323,137)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Kripke and the logic of truth.Michael Kremer - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (3):225 - 278.
Semantics and the liar paradox.Albert Visser - 1989 - Handbook of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):617--706.
How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.

View all 9 references / Add more references