Necessitism and Unrestricted Quantification

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):7 - 24 (2023)
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Abstract

As Williamson puts it, ‘necessitism’ is the metaphysical view that claims that “necessarily everything is necessarily something”. As that claim involves modal unrestricted quantification, the necessitist must accept it as a part of an intelligible discourse. Here, I present one of the main objections that have been presented against the intelligibility of unrestricted quantification: the objection based on the so-called All-in-One Principle. I then propose possible strategies that the necessitist could adopt to shield themselves from the objection.

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Violeta Conde
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

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References found in this work

Absolute generality.Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.) - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Existence and contingency.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):117–139.
Recombination unbound.Daniel Nolan - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):239-262.

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