Changing Our Nature: Ethical Naturalism, Objectivity, and History

Philosophy 98 (3):297-326 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper argues that Aristotelian ethical naturalism can combine two commitments that are often held to be incompatible: (a) a commitment to a strong form of ethical objectivity and (b) a thoroughgoing historicism about ethical value. The notions of species and life-form invoked by ethical naturalism do not, I argue, rely upon an ahistorical picture of human nature. I develop this idea by building upon Philippa Foot's defence of ethical naturalism in Natural Goodness. I go on to argue that linguistic changes in the ways we articulate the conditions of human flourishing can be understood, in some cases, as transforming those very conditions.

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Matthew Congdon
Vanderbilt University

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