Against an Argument for Objective Probabilities of Undetermined Choices

American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):127–137 (2024)
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Abstract

According to libertarianism about free will, at least some of the choices we make are free and undetermined. Many libertarians also accept the thesis that, before we make an undetermined choice, there is a nontrivial objective probability that we will make that choice. In the literature on free will, the ascription of objective probabilities is sometimes justified via an “Argument from Motivation,” which adverts to the fact that typically, in situations of choice, we are more motivated to choose some options over others. In this paper, I will examine this argument and I will argue that it is unsound, as one of its premises is at odds with a widely accepted principle governing the evolution of objective probabilities over time.

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Daniele Conti
University of Manchester

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References found in this work

Free will remains a mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
My Compatibilist Proposal.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - In Free Will and Luck. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
A compatibilist version of the theory of agent causation.Ned Markosian - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.
The Problem of Value.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - In Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Defending hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.

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