On Sharon and Spectre’s argument against closure

Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1039-1046 (2017)
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Juan Comesaña
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):247-276.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235–256.

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