Abstract

Keith A. Coleman Department of Philosophy, February 2008 University of Kansas A traditional problem concerning the meaning or logical content of statements of identity received its modern formulation in Gottlob Frege's "On Sense and Reference." Identity is taken either as a relation between objects or a relation between terms. If identity is interpreted as a relation between objects, then identity statements seem to be of little value since everything is clearly identical to itself. Assertions of identity are thought to convey significant information, but it is hard to see how they can on this interpretation. If identity is instead interpreted as a relation between terms, then identity statements still seem to be of little value since apparently they only convey a linguistic pronouncement to use certain terms interchangeably. Assertions of identity do not appear to be about the use of language, but, on this understanding of identity, they evidently are. I examine the nature of the problem and the advantages and disadvantages of each one of the two approaches to interpreting the content of identity statements. I then investigate two approaches for solving the problem from the perspective of identity as a relation between objects. The first of these represents the account provided by Gottlob Frege, and the second represents the account provided by Saul Kripke. I conclude that neither one of these accounts finally solves the problem of identity in its entirety. I then examine Michael Lockwood's approach to resolving the problem of identity based on the idea of identity as a relation between terms. I discuss and critically evaluate Lockwood's account together with a modified version of that account. After arguing for the inadequacy of the views examined as ultimate solutions to the problem of identity, I end by suggesting a strategy prompted by treating identity as indiscernibility.