Abstract

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;Often the relationship between freedom and social justice within liberal theory is portrayed in a predominantly negative way--freedom is a side-constraint on goals pursued in the name of social justice. I propose a more positive relationship between these two ideals. As well as being a side-constraint, freedom is also a goal which any programme of social justice should pursue--some issues of social justice are also issues of freedom. ;I criticise negative theories of freedom, and theories which see social justice as after-the-event compensation for past injustice, excluding concerns for future welfare. Freedom has negative and positive conditions: the free person has the space and power to determine the shape of their life. Programmes of social justice should, amongst other things, ensure that all enjoy the positive conditions of freedom. ;The impure theory of freedom gives rise to a conception of autonomy based on the notion of the autonomous chooser. Autonomous choice requires three conditions: being left alone to choose; having the capacity to choose; and having the power to act out choices. ;This conception of autonomy leads to a conception of active citizenship: the autonomous person is an active chooser, doer and participator within their community. Therefore the community must ensure that frameworks for such citizenship are in place--Civil Liberty, defining a space in which the individual can choose; Democratic Liberty, ensuring individuals have the right to participate in community decision-making; and Social Liberty, ensuring the individual enjoys the powers and resources needed to participate. ;If all people are equally entitled to citizenship, then they are equally entitled to the conditions required for such citizenship, both negative and positive. Programmes of social justice should ensure that all have access to the resources they need in order to be equally participative citizens