Abstract

The focus of this dissertation is the well-known, apparent inconsistency between Plato's Apology and his Crito: in the former work , Socrates says that he will not obey a juridical order to cease philosophizing; but, in the latter , he maintains that one should do whatever his state commands. After presenting this apparent inconsistency in my initial chapter, I devote the next six chapters to a careful examination of various commentators' attempts to effect its resolution. I conclude that no scholar prominent in our tradition--not even Santas, Vlastos, Allen, or Kraut--does an effective job. ;Throughout the dissertation, and especially in the final chapter, I contend that we can resolve the apparent inconsistency between these two dialogues by concentrating upon the speech of the personified Laws in the Crito. The Laws emphasize that if Socrates escapes, he will never again be able to practice philosophy . No matter where he goes, he will be disqualified from philosophical conversation. This means, as the Laws succinctly put it, that in exile Socrates' life will not be "worth living" . ;With this comment, the Laws connect their speech with the rather defiant speech that Socrates delivers to his jury in the Apology. There he makes it plain not only that the philosophical life is the greatest good, but also that the unphilosophical life is "not worth living" . My thesis is that this theme--the philosophical life as the only life worth living--reconciles the two dialogues. ;When the Laws demand of Socrates his unlimited fealty, they are not introduced as some set of positive laws or commands, but as "the laws and the shared commonality of the state" . I argue that what Socrates sees as the "shared commonality" of the state is its provision of a sanctuary within which the philosophical life can be lived. What evokes his loyalty in both the Apology and the Crito is the legal and political order within which philosophical discussion can thrive