Speech and communication in law and philosophy

Legal Theory 12 (1):1-17 (2006)
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Abstract

What does mean in constitutional First Amendment law and in ordinary language and the philosophy of language? Under what circumstances does intentional action count as speech? Can communication be unintentional? And what follows (in law) from the fact that almost any action can be made expressive?

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