Making Ado Without Expectations

Mind 125 (499):829-857 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper is a response to Paul Bartha’s ‘Making Do Without Expectations’. We provide an assessment of the strengths and limitations of two notable extensions of standard decision theory: relative expectation theory and Paul Bartha’s relative utility theory. These extensions are designed to provide intuitive answers to some well-known problems in decision theory involving gaps in expectations. We argue that both RET and RUT go some way towards providing solutions to the problems in question but neither extension solves all the relevant problems.

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Author Profiles

Alan Hajek
Australian National University
Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney

Citations of this work

Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):54-74.
Pascalian Expectations and Explorations.Alan Hajek & Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Roger Ariew & Yuval Avnur, The Blackwell Companion to Pascal. Wiley-Blackwell.
God meets Satan’s Apple: the paradox of creation.Rubio Daniel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):2987-3004.
Difference Minimizing Theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
In Defence of No Best World.Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):811-825.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle, Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

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