From affect programs to dynamical discrete emotions

Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407-425 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more naturally than traditional Discrete Emotion Theory for the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Putting emotions into affective polarisation.Christian von Scheve - 2015 - Cognition and Emotion 38 (4):437-441.
Do discrete emotions exist?Yang-Ming Huang, Maria Gendron & Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):427-437.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
958 (#22,494)

6 months
185 (#18,548)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Giovanna Colombetti
University of Exeter

References found in this work

Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind.Evan Thompson - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Emotions.Nico Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
The expression of the emotions in man and animal.Charles Darwin - 1890 - Mineola, New York: Dover Publications. Edited by Francis Darwin.

View all 22 references / Add more references