Motives, causal necessity, and moral accountability

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):322 – 334 (1964)
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Abstract

The author argues, Contra hume, That "the motives of human action are not related to the action in the way in which the causes of the sort of physical behaviour to which hume refers are related to that behaviour." the author contends this because he is opposed to the consequence of hume's theory that "moral appraisal presupposes 'necessity' or determinism." he concludes that we do have to explain morality in terms of human motives, But that a different sort of causality is involved here than in the physical world. (staff)

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A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1739 - Oxford,: Clarendon press.
The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics.[author unknown] - 1958 - Philosophy 35 (132):69-70.

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