A Dynamic Epistemic Logic with a Knowability Principle

In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin: Springer. pp. 406-410 (2015)
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Abstract

A dynamic epistemic logic is presented in which the single agent can reason about his knowledge stages before and after announcements. The logic is generated by reinterpreting multi agent private announcements in a single agent environment. It is shown that a knowability principle is valid for such logic: any initially true ϕ can be known after a certain number of announcements.

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Michael Cohen
Tilburg University

References found in this work

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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