Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility

Dissertation, (2018)
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Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue for a new conception of the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.

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2018-09-08

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Christopher Michael Cloos
University of California, Santa Barbara

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.

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