Epistemic levels and the problem of the criterion

Philosophical Studies 88 (2):109-140 (1997)
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Abstract

The problem of the criterion says that we can know a proposition only if we first know a criterion of truth and vice versa, hence, we cannot know any proposition or any criterion of truth. The epistemic levels response says that since knowledge does not require knowledge about knowledge, we can know a proposition without knowing a criterion of truth. This response (advocated by Chisholm and Van Cleve) presupposes that criteria of truth are epistemic principles. In general, however, criteria of truth are not epistemic principles, so the epistemic levels response to the problem of the criterion fails

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Andrew Cling
University of Alabama, Huntsville

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