Intentional omissions

Noûs 44 (1):158-177 (2010)
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Abstract

It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.

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Randolph Clarke
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Omissions as possibilities.Sara Bernstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-23.
Harming by Failing to Benefit.Neil Feit - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):809-823.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.

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