Abstract

I argue that private property can facilitate autonomy by giving individuals the power to choose the kinds of actions in which they will engage. I argue that autonomy also requires certain material and legal conditions. The objects to which an individual has access shape his or her powers, vulnerabilities, and interests by facilitating certain kinds of actions while hindering others. When I have access to an automobile, I have the power to move myself great distances, I am vulnerable to gas shortages, and I have an interest in paved highways. Therefore, one can change one's powers, vulnerabilities, and interests by altering the objects that one uses. ;From this basis, I offer a Neo-Hegelian argument for private property. Private property is justified because it guarantees each individual some control over the powers, vulnerabilities, and interests that he or she has. Private property grants each individual exclusive use of an object. Exclusive use is necessary for autonomy because it allows the individual the ability to choose his or her powers, vulnerabilities, and interests. This enables him or her to choose the kind of life he or she will lead. Poverty severely limits the kinds of actions in which one can engage, thereby restricting one's autonomy. If private property is justified because it establishes some of the conditions necessary for autonomy, it must do so for everyone. ;This argument for private property has important implications for the bundle of rights that a property owner holds. I argue that the rights normally associated with free market capitalism are not fundamental to private property. Through Marx's account of alienation, I argue that the use of markets to distribute goods occasionally facilitates autonomy, but markets must be restrained in cases where commercialization and poverty threatens autonomy. Marx was wrong to believe that all commercial transactions are harmful; still I find that, in some cases, there are good reasons to believe that free markets are harmful