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Two modes of givenness of pre-reflective self-consciousness
Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):15-30 (2019)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is threefold: First, I shall first attempt to criticize Zahavi's notion of the “experiential self” as the latter is presented and developed in his book Self and Other (201...Author's Profile
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2019-09-10
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References found in this work
Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Self-awareness and alterity: a phenomenological investigation.Dan Zahavi - 1999 - Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
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