The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg

In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 357-382 (2016)
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original Chrisman, Matthew (2016) "The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg". In Grajner, Martin, Schmechtig, Pedro, Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, pp. 357-382: De Gruyter (2016)

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Matthew Chrisman
University of Edinburgh

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