Abstract

This paper addresses Harman’s approach to enumerative induction as a case of inference to the best explanation. Αfter taking under brief consideration Hume’s critique to induction, the paper argues that Harman’s proposal does not improve the situation since the same characteristics of induction and the kind of skepticism associated with it reappear in case of inference to the best explanation. Then the paper questions Armstrong’s attempt to upgrade Harman’s suggestion by regarding a necessitation relation among two universals (a natural law) as the best explanans of the n observed cases of an enumerative induction procedure. It holds that Armstrong’s modification of Harman’s approach faces some difficulties which arise in the context of his views about instantiated universals. Instead, the paper investigates the possibility to assign the role of the explanans to a metaphysically stronger condition. It suggests that accounts of natural laws as metaphysically necessary facts concerning natural kinds can contribute in an attempt for a more fertile application of Harman’s approach.