Abstract

This chapter expores the similarities and differences between the virtue theories of Mencius (372–289 BCE) and David Hume (1711–1776 CE). Their individual explications of virtue, the main topics of their moral philosophies, focus on the sentiments. Mencius, concerned with teaching moral self-cultivation, believes that the sentiments are the grounds for achieving virtue. Hume, who aims at an empirical theory of moral evaluation, maintains that we determine a character trait as virtue through the moral sentiments. Given their moral foundation of sentiments, two frameworks of comparison are available:epistemic and structural comparisons. The former examines the philosophers’ views of the epistemic characteristics of sentiment as they relate to virtue and morality. The latter investigates how their virtue theories have a parallel structure based on the general characteristics of sentiment. I argue that a structural comparison deepens our understanding of Mencius’s views about the virtues and their cultivation. Next, I suggest that Hume’s scientific inquiry into moral evaluation informs us of another aspect of Mencius’s sentiment-based virtue. Considering the causal process involved in the arousal of sentiments, Mencius’s heart of compassion should be regarded as a mental cause that renders human nature inherently good and not as a mental effect of an aroused sentiment. Moreover, I argue that, because virtue-related sentiments take two sorts of intentional objects—one’s self and others—we can classify Mencius’s and Hume’s virtues into other-regarding and self-regarding virtues. Mencius’s cardinal virtues of Ren and Yi correspond to Hume’s humanity and dignity.