In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman,
A Companion to Wittgenstein. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 465–477 (
2017)
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Abstract
This chapter distinguishes two uses of the terms “inner” and “outer” in Wittgenstein's writings on philosophy of mind. It discusses the inner‐outer picture by exploring Wittgenstein's account of the origin and appeal of the picture, his reasons for rejecting it, and his own very different way of thinking of common‐sense psychology. The chapter considers his account of our relation to our own experiences and attitudes, and discusses his suggestion that utterances like 'I'm in pain' or 'I want an apple' are avowals or expressions of a person's experiences and attitudes. It discusses Wittgenstein's positive view of the relation between “inner” mental states and “outer” behavior. The inner–outer picture, as Wittgenstein describes it, has a metaphysical and an epistemic dimension. The inner–outer picture encourages the view that our use of language in self‐ascriptions of current experiences and attitudes is analogous to its use in talking about the non‐mental world.