Franz Brentano y Leonardo Polo: una aproximación en torno al significado de lo psíquico

Studia Poliana 6:99-119 (2004)
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Abstract

One of the most important critiques of Brentano’s thought has been the one of “psychologism”. Nevertheless, a correct study of some of his thesis cannot prove this conclusion. On the other hand, a comparison to Polo’s notion of life —especially, cognitive life and its relation to the physical realm— allows us to grasp a better understanding of Brentano’s proposal on the psychical aspect of knowledge. This shows that Husserl’s corrections to Brentano’s notion of intentionality, i.e. its idealization, is not valid

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