What is it to be a rational agent?

In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is it to be a rational agent? The orthodox answer to this question can be summarized by a slogan: Rationality is a matter of recognizing and responding to reasons. But is the orthodoxy correct? In this chapter, I explore an alternative way of thinking about what it is to be a rational agent according to which a central activity of rational agency is the creation of reasons. I explain how the idea of metaphysical grounding can help make sense of the idea that as rational agents, we can, quite literally, create reasons. I end by suggesting a reason to take this alternative view of rational agency seriously. The orthodoxy faces a challenge: How do rational agents make choices within ‘well-formed choice situations’? By allowing that we have the normative power to create reasons, we have a satisfying and attractive solution to this question.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,597

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Rational Agent.Rüdiger Bittner - 2001 - In Doing things for reasons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hard Choices.Ruth Chang - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):1-21.
Internal reasons and practical limits on rational deliberation.Carolyn Mason - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):163 – 177.
Do We Have Normative Powers?Ruth Chang - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):275-300.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
A Puzzle About Morality and Rationality.Zhen Chen - 1999 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
Voluntarist reasons and the sources of normativity.Ruth Chang - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-71.
Is The Concept Of Rational Agency Coherent?Bryony Pierce - 2006 - Philosophical Writings 33 (3).

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-01-19

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ruth Chang
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

The Normative Insignificance of the Will.Jason Kay - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references