Why do individuals with autism lack the motivation or capacity to share intentions?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):695-696 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Tomasello et al. highlight how in combination cognitive impairments and affective impairments help explain why individuals with autism do not enter fully into human culture. We query whether the motivational component is a later development in human ontogeny and whether the cognitive level of intention reading is intact in autism. A key question is what neuropsychological impairments underlie this cognitive–affective impairment.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Psychopathy, Autism and Questions of Moral Agency.Mara Bollard - 2013 - In Christopher D. Herrera & Alexandra Perry (eds.), Ethics and Neurodiversity. Cambridge Scholars University. pp. 238-259.
What neurodevelopmental disorders can reveal about cognitive architecture.Helen Tager-Flusberg - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York, US: Oxford University Press on Demand. pp. 272--288.
Autism, Empathy and Questions of Moral Agency.Timothy Krahn & Andrew Fenton - 2009 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (2):145-166.
Emotions and moral agency.Lisa Damm - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):275-292.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
48 (#457,686)

6 months
8 (#580,966)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references