Transmission Failure, AGM Style

Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398 (2013)
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Abstract

This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to be suffcient to establish the truth of a much-discussed intuition regarding transmission failure.

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10.1007/s10670-012-9364-9

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Jake Chandler
La Trobe University

Citations of this work

Difference-making conditionals and the relevant Ramsey test.Hans Rott - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):133-164.
Closure, deduction and hinge commitments.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3533-3551.

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References found in this work

(Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Solutions to Exercises.Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Knowledge in Flux.Henry E. Kyburg & Peter Gardenfors - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):519-521.
Facts and Certainty.Crispin Wright - 1985 - Proceedings of the British Academy 71:429-472.
On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.

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