Abstract

The problem of the intuition of the individual as such, i. e. of its individuality (the „principle of individuation“) gave rise to many controversies. The problem becomes especially urgent in the light of the Christian revelation, since Christianity in the first place relates to the singular and individual (and therefore contingent), whereas the universal assumes only a secondary rôle. John Duns Scotus deals with this theologico-philosophical problem and sets out to defend intellective intuition of the individual as a whole. He distinguishes three kinds within this type of cognition: perfect intuitive intellective cognition which is possible only in patria, direct but imperfect (i. e. not penetrating the principle of individuation) intuitive intellective cognition which relates to contingent truths and spiritual acts, and, finally, imperfect and indirect intuitive intellective cognition, i. e. acts of recalling the past intuitive cognitions. In these three examples the fundamental Scotus’s arguments are exhibited and the extent to which Scotus transgresses the limits of Aristotelian epistemology is made clear.