Abstract

Bence Nanay holds, that attention which is focused on one object, and distributed acrossits properties, gives rise to disinterestedness in phenomenal experience, and it therefore is involved in the occurence of the most paradigmatic kind of aesthetic experience.It is for this reason, that Nanay defines this sort of attention as "aesthetic attention". In this thesis, I point out, that Nanay's doctrine does justice to facts and phenomena,and that it succeeds in specifiying one of the necessary conditions, of what he takes as the "paradigmatic kind" of aesthetic experience. Nevertheless, as I go on to argue, Nanay fails to account for dissinterestedness' being insufficient for aesthetic experience, and avoids to ask the question we have been longing to ask, namely whether there is such a thing, as attention which is both necessary and sufficient for aesthetic experience. I, thereafter, provide an answer to this question, according to which aesthetic attention is, essencially, attention which is focused on non-derivative value, in an aesthetic context. In the remaining of the text, I make use of Gestalt theory, and thus explore the relationship between the kind of attention Nanay conceived of as "aesthetic attention", and the kind I define as such.