Abstract

The current study aims to clarify the meaning, the epistemic construction, and the pragmatics of the term _āgama_ occurring in _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_ I.7 and its commentaries. Since _āgama_ is a linguistic construction, this paper is also a contribution to the inquiry into the philosophy of language of the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_. The inclusion of linguistic-philosophical arguments corroborates the Pātañjalayoga system of philosophy as a _śāstra_ text and its logical and epistemological paradigm. The structure of the present work is as follows: a first part strictly dealing with textual sources, and a second where the content of textual sources is discussed. Relying on the early literature ranging from the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_ (c. 400 CE) to the _Pātañjalayogasūtravṛtti_ of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (PYV, half of 17th—half of 18th cent. CE), to _āgama_ can be accorded two principal meanings: as a generic verbal testimony, and as authoritative verbal teachings. Grounded on the evaluated textual material, the second part of this essay presents a hypothesis aiming at the understanding of verbal testimony: in the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_, _āgama_ exhibits an epistemological, linguistic and psychological construction. In fact, as an epistemic theory of verbal testimony _āgama_ functions following three main vectors being: (a) epistemological source and instance of valid cognition, namely a _pramāṇa_, (b) linguistically structured, _āgama_ exhibits a propositional structure (_vākya_); and (c) a mental episode, placing _āgama_ as one among the different mental events (_cittavṛtti_) described in the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_.