The Metalogic of Mathematical Logic

Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 20:124-138 (1971)
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Abstract

IT cannot be denied that metaphysics is an unpopular subject among many contemporary professional philosophers. Historically speaking, the reasons for this present-day phenomenon can be traced back to the rise and spread of philosophical Idealism over the past several hundred years. What is common to all Idealistic philosophers is the orientation adopted at the beginnings of their philosophical investigations: they attempt to unravel the mysteries of being by viewing being through ideas. Their prime concern becomes the analyses of terms and propositions. Indeed, this approach is so commonplace that many thinkers cannot imagine doing things in any other way. In our age this approach shows up very clearly in the way many thinkers are perfectly willing to talk about propositions but possess a deep aversion to talking about what a thing is in itself. It is sometimes said that we currently live in a philosophical era dominated by materialism. It would seem, however, that the situation is the other way around; discussions of intramental entities take up most of the time of many philosophers, at least of non-scholastic philosophers. Most scholastic philosophers still want to talk about things i.e. extramental entities. Most of their contemporary philosophers, on the other hand, are perfectly content talking about propositions. If the latter is ever to move closer to the former group, it would seem that what is required is a more materialistic attitude on their part, in the sense of a greater concentration on things as opposed to ideas.

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