The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism: Two Theories?

Apeiron 53 (4):463-486 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print. This paper is dedicated to exploring the alleged difference between Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ accounts of the post-mortal survival of the souls and the conceptions of personal identity that these accounts underpin. I argue that while Cleanthes conceptualised the personal identity as grounded in the rational soul, Chrysippus conceptualised it as an embodied rational soul. I also suggest that this difference between the two early Stoics might have been due to Chrysippus' metaphysical commitments arising from his response to the Growing Argument put forth by the Academics rather than the critique of his teacher.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,716

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-09-13

Downloads
95 (#237,957)

6 months
6 (#738,277)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Aiste Celkyte
Leiden University

References found in this work

Determinism and freedom in Stoic philosophy.Susanne Bobzien - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Stoic Criterion of Identity.David Sedley - 1982 - Phronesis 27 (3):255-275.
Stoic Gunk.Daniel P. Nolan - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (2):162-183.

View all 28 references / Add more references